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ABSTRACT In recent years, the scientiﬁc debate on populism has experienced a new
momentum: on the one hand, the emergence of new populisms even in Western democracies
and on the other hand, disagreement among scholars on the deﬁnition of populism. In this
context, new trends have emerged—such as those concerning the link between populism and
technology—along with the need to revise the traditional study paradigms, which are often
difﬁcult to operationalise. The transformation of the political sphere appears to be strongly
interconnected with the digital media landscape. If the new forms of communication are the
cause or the effect of processes, such as the personalisation of leadership, the verticalisation
of political organisations, the presidentialisation of political parties, or the social de-
legitimisation of the old “intermediate bodies”, these forms should be the subject of ongoing
research. At the same time, a very simplistic storyline tries to overlap the rise of neo-populist
parties with their use of communication technologies. A quality that is common to the many
different populisms is an appeal to the use of direct democracy as a tool to empower citizens.
Populism itself is sometimes portrayed as almost synonymous with direct democracy. At the
same time, direct democracy is used by populists as a critique of the lack of participation in
representative democracy and the need to make it more participatory. In this perspective,
technology becomes a tool (and a storyline) to facilitate the use of direct democracy and the
rise of a new form of “hyper-representation”. At the same time, concepts such as efﬁciency,
privatisation, short-termism, newism, and meritocracy are keywords successfully used by
populist leaders, technocracy élites and neo-liberal political leaders. In other words, we can
highlight a strange meeting between technological storytelling about direct democracy and
technocracy myths. Even among the new populist parties, the technopopulists appear to
represent an important category, whose peculiarities can easily be put into evidence using
some empirical tools (such as content analysis). The aim of this article is to investigate the
relationships between technocracy, direct democracy’s storytelling and hyper-representation
as a distinctive characteristic of neo-populisms.
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Introduction
This article is predominantly theoretical, although some ofthe theoretical aspects presented here emerged from theearly outcomes of long-term research into populism and
populist parties in Europe. The analysis offered here is therefore
supported by some empirical results, although they are not suf-
ﬁcient to describe and comprehensively analyse a complex set of
phenomena such as that of new populisms.
The aim of this article is to illustrate the peculiarities of
emerging populism in Italian political life.1 In particular, we have
considered the most used deﬁnitions of populism: a) as a political
communication style and/or a set of discursive practices
(Taguieff, 2002; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Mofﬁtt and Tormey,
2014); b) as a political strategy framed in certain types of orga-
nisation (Weyland, 2001; Betz, 2002; Kriesi, 2015); and c) as an
ideology (Mudde, 2004; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; van Kessel,
2015). At the same time, we propose using another approach that
—even if it is compatible with other theoretical deﬁnitions–is
based upon the concept of hyper-representation (Mastropaolo,
2016; Fasano et al., 2016). Using the outcomes from research on
the major Italian political parties and their leaders, we have built a
taxonomy of populisms in Italy; in particular, we have observed
that aside from the most common “types” of populism (as they
are referred to in the scientiﬁc literature), speciﬁc forms of
populism, strongly related to the rhetoric on technology, are
emerging. We have, in this case, used the concept of technopo-
pulism; this is a typology of populism that shows areas over-
lapping with the political mediatisation processes.
The article ﬁrst presents an account of the crisis of repre-
sentation and its connection with the emerging trends in populist
experiences; we then turn to the concept of populism as hyper-
representation; we follow with a third section discussing the four
types of populism as derived from our research on political
parties and their leaders in Italy; we then conclude this work with
a fourth section focused on technopopulism and its speciﬁc role
in the Italian political scene (but also considering the emerging
form of technopopulism in Europe).
The crisis of representation
Populisms—in the various and sometimes inevitably contra-
dictory deﬁnitions—are often interpreted as responses to the lack
of participation that distinguishes liberal representative democ-
racies. This interpretation of the emergence of populisms and,
with them, of so-called neo-populist parties is based on awareness
of a crisis of representation (Mair, 2000; Papadopoulos, 2013;
Sorice, 2014). Liberal democracy is, in fact, a “representative”
democracy; historically centred on its electoral nature (though
not immediately on the idea of universal suffrage or even on the
concept of participation), it is based on a process of delegation.
Representative democracy today presents four main character-
istics: “(a) the sovereignty of the people expressed through the
election of the representatives; (b) representation as a free-lance
relationship; (c) an electoral mechanism that ensures a certain
degree of responsibility towards the people by the representatives
who speak and act in their name; (d) universal suffrage based on
representation on political equality” (Urbinati, 2013a, p 89).
Representative democracy, however, only works to avoid a con-
tradiction between imperative mandate and free mandate (Sorice,
2014), so that the latter is tempered by some form of popular
control. To achieve this difﬁcult equilibrium, intermediate bodies
are needed; it is only within the frame of these bodies that the
debate and the legitimisation of public choices are possible. The
political mandate, in other words, is unique and needs the input
of political parties or similar social aggregations. However, what
occurs if the parties lose their credibility and even the legitimacy
of representation? In these cases, different trends emerge that are
often summarised under the populist label. “Whenever a part of
the ‘people’ or a whole people does not feel represented, in one
way or another some sort of reaction comes back and it is named
populism” (Revelli, 2017, p 3). It is also true that populism “is not
a revolutionary movement because it does not create people’s
sovereignty but intervenes once people’s sovereignty exists and its
values and rules are written in a constitution. Populism represents
an appeal to the people in a political order in which the people is
formally already the sovereign” (Urbinati, 2013b, p 145). In other
words, populism should be considered to be a mutation of
representative democracy.2
The concept of representation is traditionally linked to two
reference poles: on the one hand, the electoral dimension, on the
other, the notion of participation. In fact, this connection is
relatively recent and it ﬁnds its roots in the “democracy-election”
linkage, which is, however, ideological. Bernard Manin (1995), for
example, noted that contemporary democratic governments are
the starting point for the evolution of a political system conceived
to mitigate the “subversive” effects of democracy. This trend is
also present in the development of the “electoral method” in the
USA. James Madison, for instance, judged democracy as “a show
full of troubles and disputes”, destined for a quick and violent
death (Madison, 1787). The same term “democracy” was used
with suspicion; the conceptual overlap between a “republican” and
a “democracy” choice is just a successful “storyline “, and it sounds
ideological.
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson referred to substantial
breakdowns between citizens and governors, wherein the latter
should be able to represent the instances of all due to a type of
superiority, a kind of “natural aristocracy”, as Jefferson deﬁned it
(Dupuis-Déri, 2013). The elective method, in other words,
developed at the dawn of “liberal democracies” as a system used to
control power by economic oligarchies legitimised by popular
vote (van Reybrouck, 2016). The key element of the elective
method was, in fact, the recruitment of the political class; indeed,
for Jefferson and Madison, the active electorate was open to all,
the passive one was reserved for the “meritorious”, a sort of
“moral” élite that in fact coincided with the political and eco-
nomic ruling classes.
The so-called “crisis of democracy” developed within the short-
circuit between the de-legitimisation of representative institutions
(the intermediate bodies) and individuals’ perception of a loss of
power, as it appears mass political parties have guaranteed in the
past. Peter Mair (2000), introducing the concept of “partyless
democracy”, perfectly identiﬁed one of the critical elements of
liberal democracies. The progressive erosion of the long-term
identities on which the party’s legitimisation was founded has
also put in crisis the established forms of political participation.
The political party’s crisis obviously has many causes; certainly,
one very important cause is represented by the redeﬁnition of
those cleavages upon which traditional parties founded their own
legitimacy and their collective identity. It is no coincidence that
“high / low” or “centre / peripheral” fractures are more suitable
today for explaining new social conﬂicts.3
Another critical element to consider is the crisis of public
bureaucracies, which is one of the six variables that Yves Sintomer
(2011) identiﬁes as the structural causes of crises of democracies.
The crisis of public bureaucracies, which has often contributed to
social restraint, lies within the afﬁrmation of New Public Man-
agement, which in Northern Europe has boosted the empower-
ment and growth of the state’s efﬁciency towards citizens and in
the rest of Europe has become the ideological shore of the
strongest neo-liberal approaches: state-enterprise rhetoric
(Crouch, 2003) or the idea of a light state has been a tool for the
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commodiﬁcation of citizenship and for hastening the crisis of
democratic institutions. In this regard, the political left also bears
heavy responsibilities in several European crises: left and centre-
left parties, in fact, valued and defended citizens as workers or
wage-earners but not as users of services or persons with rights.
At the same time, many parties within the socialist democratic
tradition have a-critically accepted the rules of ﬁnancial capital-
ism, heightening their own crisis of legitimacy. Furthermore, they
thereby contribute, in fact, to the perception of a uniform political
body that is easily stigmatised as “non-people” against which the
“true” people could use anti-representational rhetoric.4
By contrast, Mény and Surel (2002, p 21) identiﬁed in the
afﬁrmation of populism the presence of a crisis of political
intermediation, the process of personalising power and with it,
the centrality of the media in political life.
Populism as hyper-representation
In this crisis of organised political representation, one of the
ideological elements of neo-populist parties resides precisely in an
attempt to delegitimise representation because they consider it to
be exhausted by confronting the opportunities offered by “bot-
tom-up” participation. In this framework, ‘the people’ is not
conceived as aggregates of classes or social groups; it is, instead,
deﬁned as a homogenous mass opposing the “non-people”
(Ionescu and Gellner, 1969; Weyland, 1999); the latter being, of
course, primarily composed of politicians of any ideological
position and subsequently by those who—rightly or wrongly—
are considered to be part of the power system managed by the
“non-people”.
Summarising, we can highlight some elements concerning the
relationships between representation and populism.
1. Representation has been, historically, a legitimation of
oligarchies through the electoral method and a device for
reducing democratic participation.
2. Nevertheless, it has become an important tool in constitu-
tional democracies to broaden the base of participation,
thanks mainly to the role of mass parties.
3. The party’s legitimacy crisis has created (along with other
causes) a clear crisis of representation.
4. The re-emergence of “populist” claims and the emergence of
neo-populist parties are responses to the representation
deﬁcit. This answer assumes a communication strategy of
calling for “bottom-up participation” but it declines into the
development of surrogate forms of representation, such as
those deﬁned as hyper-representation.
5. Hyper-representation can also be considered to be legit-
imised authoritarian leaderism, which can even assume
forms of the populism of government. Elements of anti-
system communicative rhetoric are paradoxically present
even in some forms of this government type. Destabilised
representation is a liberalised representation. Hyper-
representation is based on the hyper-pluralism of modern
societies and, at the same time, it fuels it, also thanks to the
media. If the hypo-representation of politics (the absence of
institutionalised politics due to the crisis of political parties as
intermediate bodies) promotes personalisation, hyper-
representation is a kind of fragmentation and dispersion of
the people that is reconstituted into “unity” thanks to the
“discourse” of populisms (Mofﬁtt and Tormey, 2014). 5
6. The emphasis on participation usually runs out in the
plebiscitary appeal to legitimise the leader (supreme
representative of the people) against all others (the non-
people).
7. Reference to the most articulated forms of participatory and
deliberative democracy is present in only some trends within
social populism that are historically connected to the anti-
establishment, but not anti-system, position of the radical left
or instances of social movements (from those against
austerity to those who can be placed in the “rebel by doing”
group) (De Blasio and Sorice, 2014).
In many cases, the emphasis on bottom-up participation is
mostly reduced to (a) an emphasis on direct democracy; (b) a
legitimation of authoritarian leaderships, where the “leader”
becomes the “supreme representative” of popular interests; or (c)
the phenomena of ethnotribalism, a tactical tool for building an
“us” against “them” tendency that enhances the popular identity
against the “non-people” composed of minoritarian élites. A
variation of authoritarian leadership, however, is represented by
politicians who deﬁne themselves as “new”: this constitutes an
example of “top-down populism” or “governmental populism”
(Revelli, 2017, p 26). The outcomes of the highly emphasised
“bottom-up participation” are not merely the development of
claims for representation (Saward 2010) but also shift towards the
radical de-structuring of the same representation in favour of
what can be effectively deﬁned as hyper-representation (Mas-
tropaolo, 2016).6
Figure 1 shows schematically the shifting from representation
to hyper-representation.
The same rhetoric on direct democracy tends to restore a
principle of aggregation (as in Madison’s conceptions of the
representative method); it is no coincidence that populist move-
ments and parties tend to reject the logic of participatory
democracy or the methods of deliberation. This logic is some-
times rejected due to the presumed efﬁciency of technologies for
the improvement of democracy. Considering the continuous and
responsible participation of everyone, these movements prefer the
episodic and decisive exercise of the referendum (the use of
judicial or electoral instruments within representative democ-
racies). Considering the endogenous dimension (della Porta,
2013) of democratic processes, they prefer the exogenous
dimension that is born and exhausted in the aggregative logic of
the vote or the plebiscite.
Following Donatella della Porta’s analysis of democracy, Table 1
shows the four types of democracy as they emerge from the cross
between decision methods (majoritarian vote or deliberation) and
the political process (delegation or participation). While direct
democracy can be framed in the ﬁrst chart corner, deliberative-
participatory democracy is based upon the logic of inclusiveness
and the idea of citizenship as knowledge.
We should still emphasise that the concept of citizenship
constitutes one the backgrounds, simultaneously, of liberal
democracies, of the aggregative structure of direct democracy and
of some populist rhetoric.
It is not casualty that the populist appeal looks for legitimation
in the concept of citizenship as status (in Italy: “Prima gli italiani!”
The Italians First, in the UK: “The English ﬁrst!”, in Ticino-
Switzerland: “Prima i nostri!” Ours ﬁrst).”) In these cases, citi-
zenship is ascriptive: in many cases, representative democracy
and direct democracy are both anchored to the idea of citizenship
as status; this is also the background in which the neo-liberal
ideology is rooted (Mastropaolo, 2000).
Another perspective is represented by the concept of citizen-
ship as a body of civic knowledge, a sort of social frame in which
participation in decision-making processes is a social right. The
logic of inclusiveness—which is at the base of the idea of citi-
zenship as civic knowledge—also represents a tool to improve the
quality of democracy towards a participatory style. In other
words, the concept of citizenship as status links together the
emphasis on direct democracy and some important aspects of
populist rhetoric. Here, the inclusiveness of people having civic
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knowledge constitutes the basic point of reference for afﬁliative
citizenship. In this perspective, participatory democracy can
represent a sort of counter-hegemonic tool; the idea of partici-
pation in decision-making processes as a social right is, in fact,
one of the key concepts used by left-wing political parties.
Other scholars have highlighted the relationships between
populism and the need for participation. Cas Mudde, for
example, highlights the gap between participation and populism:
“The heartland of contemporary populism is focused primarily on
the output and not on the input of democracy”7 (Mudde, 2015).
Even the centrality of the leader (also in popular imagination)
appears to be in support of Mudde’s thesis. However, we can also
refer to the concept of claims of representation, which often
involve multiple and sometimes overlapping audiences; there can
Table 1 Four types of democracy and the place of direct democracy
Majoritarian Vote Deliberation 
Delegation 
(exogenous identities)
Liberal democracy Liberal deliberative 
democracy 
Participation 
(endogenous identities) 
Participatory democracy Deliberative-participatory 
democracy 
Direct democracy 
Participatory democracy is legitimised 
by inclusiveness 
Citizenship as civic knowledge 
Source: Della Porta (2013) with modiﬁcations
Representation 
Surrogate representation 
• Apathy (exit) 
• Overlapping between 
delegate and trustee 
Hyper representation 
• Democratic 
Innovations 
• Deliberative-
participatory 
democracy 
• Voice 
• Direct democracy 
• Plebiscitarian 
leadership 
• Anti-pluralist 
• Representation deicit 
• Claim for representation 
Fig. 1 Hyper representation. Source: The Authors
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be differences between intended and actual audiences. The notion
of the audience (as it emerges from the tradition of audience and
cultural studies) is crucial to representation and much neglected
in studies of representation (Saward, 2010). Most likely, we could
also consider populism as a peculiar form of audience repre-
sentation. In this sense, the concept of hyper-representation can
effectively be used to coherently connect some of the empirical
evidence emerging from the analysis of populist leader discourses
and political party manifestos.
Our research
The aim of our research is to better deﬁne some theoretical
questions about populism, starting from three research questions:
RQ1. How can populism be measured? How can a “taxonomy”
of populism be deﬁned?
RQ2. Do populist and non-populist political parties adopt a
populist communication style? Do they use speciﬁc topics?
RQ3. Which communication styles do leaders use and which
features characterise each style? Does the operationalisation of
the populist communication style ﬁt the ideological indicators
emerging in the literature?
In our research, we have combined three methods. With the
ﬁrst two methods, we have—de facto—replicated the measure-
ment of populism as proposed and achieved by Teun Pauwels
(2014) in his study on populism in Belgium, Germany and the
Netherlands. We have used, in other words, a simple classiﬁcation
through minimal deﬁnition (i.e., analysing whether a party mat-
ches all minimal criteria to be labelled populist) and a content
analysis of party and election manifestos.
Additionally, our summary codebook is very similar to that
used by Pauwels; it starts from three interrelated characteristics
that constitute the background of populisms: (a) populism
emphasising the role and centrality of the “people”; (b) populism
as an anti-elitist position and (c) populism as an exclusionary
ideology (based on the rhetoric of “us”—the people—against
“them”—the “others”—conceived as an indistinct entity). The
analysis of party manifestos has been conducted using content
analysis, assuming that the manifestos can be considered to be
outputs of populism as a type of thin- centred ideology (Mair and
Mudde, 1998; Mudde, 2000; Pauwels, 2014) and a “political style”
(Mofﬁtt and Tormey, 2014). In this case, we have used a speciﬁc
type of content analysis and, in particular, evaluative assertion
analysis. The basic idea behind this technique is that language is
never neutral and that therefore it always produces a possible
interpretation of the attitude of the source (Pauwels, 2014). If this
is true, then it is always possible to assess the position and/or
attitude of the author of the text under analysis; such evaluation is
dichotomous (favourable/opposite, likes/dislikes, positive/nega-
tive, to be shared/to be rejected, etc.). The dichotomous assess-
ment is clearly a reduction in complexity (a hyper-simpliﬁcation,
perhaps even a trivialisation); at the same time, however, it allows
easier classiﬁcation.
To evaluate assertions, we ﬁrst had to identify the objects of the
attitudes present in the text (or in the corpus) under study,
selecting those relevant to the research. Next, we identiﬁed the
assertions associated with the objects of the previously selected
attitude. At this point, it was useful to try to reduce the com-
plexity of the evaluation assertions (in some cases, they can be
very complex, but they will certainly be less complex in political
discourses with strong demagogic connotations). Only after
completing these preliminary tasks did it become possible to carry
out a detailed analysis of the texts. To do this, we needed to: (a)
assign a value to the components of every assertion (we needed to
measure the semantic differential) and then (b) calculate the
resulting scores. This last step allowed us to create an evaluation
index. The evaluation of assertions is useful for analysing political
language. It is also useful for studying semantic evaluation dif-
ferentials; in this case, we had to score both the evaluative
assertions and those ones referred to as “connectors” (the scores
can be negative, positive or neutral). Examples of evaluative
assertions are expressions such as “partito dell’odio” (party of
hatred) “comunisti mangia-bambini” (communist children eaters),
“Italia del fare” (Italy of doing) and so on. To measure the
assertions, a very simple formula is commonly used, which we
state as follows:
Vi ¼
Pn
et etn  cnPn
c¼1 cn
where V is the average level of evaluation in the n themes of type
i, et represents the terms of evaluation, and c is the score we
attribute to the verbal connections.
A third method concerns the analysis of leaders’ ofﬁcial dis-
course and ofﬁcial documents, which are investigated using a
simpliﬁed frame analysis. All documents were retrieved from
ofﬁcial sources in their entirety. We performed a ﬁrst round of
manual coding, applying a frame analysis to the ofﬁcial docu-
ments to build the codebook following a grounded approach and
to identify the whole spectrum of issues that they cover. The
frame analysis method allowed us to distinguish between mea-
sures (i.e., speciﬁc proposals, pieces of legislation, etc.), which we
treated as footings, and the motivations for adopting them, or
frames; in particular, we found three possible frames: economic
constraints or opportunities, questions concerning securitisation
and the enhancement of democracy.8
We also found a relationship between anti-political rhetoric as
deﬁned by Michele Sorice (2014) and the discursive arguments
presented in the parties’ manifestos.
The adoption of anti-political rhetoric appears to be a dis-
tinctive characteristic of populism; the four rhetorical styles tend
to emphasise exclusionary populism. Anti-politics is only a
populist rhetoric that feeds on the clash between “us” and “them”;
it thus adopts a mechanism of ideological uniﬁcation. In other
words, anti-politics is absolutely ideological, even when it adopts
discursive strategies against party “ideologies” (Table 2).
We can deﬁne the ﬁrst principle as rhetoric against the system;
it is perhaps one of the most common forms of political language,
and not only within recent decades. In this type of rhetoric, the
“enemy” is the institutional system and/or the way in which the
state itself is organised. This rhetoric uses a kind of language and
speciﬁc grammar that characterise the forms of populism that do
not recognise the legitimacy of the institutional structure. Usually,
it is the party system (and/or the way it is organised) that is
blamed, in reference to an analysis (it does not matter if pre-
sumed or real) of its structural weaknesses and inability to pro-
duce lasting (or strong) governments.
Table 2 Anti-political rhetoric
Anti-political rhetoric Against
Anti-system rhetoric Institutions, state, public organisations
Anti-state rhetoric Central state, intrusive government, tax
Anti-party rhetoric Professional and discredited politicians
(“casta”), parties
Anti-intellectual rhetoric Intellectuals, professors
Source: Sorice (2014)
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The second type of anti-political rhetoric is anti-state rhetoric.
For the most part, the welfare system comes under attack from
this type of rhetoric. Its main targets are the state, which it
accuses of being “nosy” and of seeking to meddle even in the
private life of its citizens; the government, usually accused of
being too intrusive and in constant search of new and more
sophisticated forms of taxation; and public ofﬁcials with judicial
powers (magistrates), who, particularly in Italy, have been pub-
licly and vehemently blamed by many centre-right politicians for
some of the country’s shortcomings (the slowness of the justice
system, the ease with which criminals are released, the ostensible
links between justice and politics). This anti-political rhetoric
embraces cultural and political spheres that in other respects are
miles apart; the Lega Nord’s criticism of centralised government
(clearly evoked by the expression “Roma ladrona”—thieving
Rome) has much in common with propaganda against the “tax
collector state” (and, in general, against the state’s supposed
excessive meddling in the lives of its citizens) voiced by the
champions of an ultra-liberal approach to the economy and the
organisation of society. Anti-political rhetoric relies on a small
number of key concepts: (a) “making one’s own decisions about
one’s future”, that “future” being either personal (as a member of
society) or collective (as the “North” or the “South”); (b) a moral
obligation “not to pay others to squander resources”, “squander
resources” including the costs of the national health system and
costs to the environment; (c) the advantages of the state as a
“neutral” and “distant” regulator; (d) the need for “few laws” that
are organised above all to prevent the judiciary (accused of being
“slow”, “bureaucratic” or “partisan”) from enjoying “too much”
freedom of action; and (e) attacking the inefﬁciency of the justice
system, which allegedly provides too many “safeguards” for those
suspected or accused of various offences (politicised justice).
Some political parties often strategically combine slogans that are
fundamentally “anti-safeguard” and de facto in favour of politi-
cised justice, with political rhetoric in which the judiciary is
accused of being permissive. Contrary to appearances, this is not
a schizophrenic message: it is a clear populist strategy that stig-
matises the judiciary for the “otherness” that sets it apart from the
people, with the judge characterised as someone “other” than us.
Therefore, we have “us” (the people) on one side and “them” (the
judiciary) on the other in the role of “persecutor” or “defender of
criminals” according to circumstances.9
The third form of anti-political rhetoric is anti-party. In reality,
the target of this type of rhetoric is not just political parties but
the whole political system organised around parties and political
movements. In other words, without becoming explicitly anti-
system, this rhetoric often borrows some anti-system content and
expressions. Anti-party rhetoric is fuelled by a strong aversion to
“professional” politicians, who are accused of being unaware of
the real needs of the “people”. The political “caste”10 thus becomes
another group of “them” against “us”. This anti-party rhetoric
serves to launch a new kind of politician who presents himself/
herself as a receptacle for the popular “us” to be set against the
“them” of “Italy’s old political class” (using the same words Silvio
Berlusconi used in his televised discourse of January 1994, when
he presented himself as leader of a new political party). Anti-party
rhetoric addresses mainly (though not exclusively) television
viewers and is greatly aided in this by the progressive popular-
isation of politics (Mazzoleni and Sfardini, 2010). Silvio Berlus-
coni is emblematic of the telepopulist leader (Taguieff, 2002) who
builds his diversiﬁcation strategy with the help of television and
simultaneously constantly re-asserts his “newism”. Similarly, since
2013, Matteo Renzi has been focusing his attention on commu-
nication technology to assert his “newism” as a “scrapper”. In the
same frame, Beppe Grillo, comedian, blogger, and above, inﬂu-
ential leader of the MoVimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement or
M5S), describes professional “politicians” as aliens with no links
to Italian society, and the proposal for online direct democracy is
presented as a tool to marginalise the “old” political parties. Here,
the populace is not an aggregation of classes or social groups; it is
a homogeneous mass11 that opposes the “non-people” (consisting
in this case of politicians, regardless of ideology or institutional
position).
The fourth type of anti-political rhetoric is anti-intellectual. It
is not new in the Italian political scene (and indeed also exists
outside Italy12). Once again, the conﬂict is between the popular
“us”—consisting of those who perform manual jobs and make
hardnosed “realistic” lifestyle choices—and “them”, the professors
(or “upstart academics”) as well as public sector employees
likened to intellectuals because they are also incapable of hard-
nosed realism (and are essentially “slackers”). While the rhetoric
against “so-called culture” dates back to 1949, when the expres-
sion “culturame” was ﬁrst used at the Christian Democrats’ party
conference in Venice by Mario Scelba to attack intellectuals from
the opposing political camp,13 the tactic of demonising culture
and intellectuals peaked during the 2009–2011 period with a
comeback in Matteo Renzi’s leadership of the Democratic Party
and Matteo Salvini’s leadership of the Northern League. This
rhetoric returned during the campaign for the “constitutional
referendum” of 2016: the many academics deployed against the
proposed constitutional reform (defeated in the referendum vote)
were labelled by many leaders of the Democratic Party as “pro-
fessoroni” (a fundamentally derogatory and derisive term). Anti-
intellectual rhetoric relied on the development of a new media
hegemony that Massimiliano Panarari (2010) has appropriately
termed a sub-cultural hegemony. The de-legitimisation of intel-
lectual work is ideological. It tends to sideline argumentation in
favour of shouting spectacles, replacing the principle of authority
with the “principle of majority”.
Four types of populism
The rhetoric of bottom-up participation hides the temptation of
“leaderism”14 on one side and the push for hyper-representation
on the other. What emerges from the analysis of posters, the
programmes of political parties and the public speeches of
populist party leaders in the Italian public sphere is a very
peculiar picture. In this study, we have tried to identify the dif-
ferent types of populism and their main characteristics. Adopting
an approach based on content analysis—and substantially repli-
cating that used by Teun Pauwels (2014) in his inﬂuential study
on populism in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands—we
have identiﬁed four predominant types of populism in Italy.15
These types are also useful to frame and position the Italian
populist parties. The four types (neo-liberal populism, social
populism, national populism, and technopopulism) have several
common characteristics (see Table 3). Among these, we can
observe an emphasis on the value of direct democracy and the
emergence of hyper-representation logic (albeit with different
forms) with the (signiﬁcant) exception of social (or democratic16)
populism, in which only areas of the radical left and antagonistic
social movements are located. It is no coincidence that only the
latter segment explicitly refers to participatory democracy, clearly
identiﬁed as an alternative to liberal democracy and conveniently
cut from direct democracy (on parties and movements against
austerity, see della Porta et al., 2017). It should also be noted that
in this area, the anti-establishment rhetoric almost completely
replaces the anti-system position (typical, for example, of the
right-wing and ethnic populisms). It is useful, here, to highlight
that the radical left17—across Europe and especially in Italy—is
characterised by a strong anti-establishment position, but it is not
anti-system (Damiani, 2017).
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Table 3 shows the basic elements and the key ﬁgures as they
emerged from our study of party and electoral manifestos. We
must underline some relevant aspects. Among the key ﬁgures, for
example, we noted the insurgence of two types of penal populism
(Anastasia et al., 2015); the ﬁrst type is based on the clash
between the rule of law and the “rule of the people”, and the
second type is framed in a conservative rhetoric of “law and
order”. All four populisms include concern with the corruption of
the élites and/or the government and belief in the lack of efﬁ-
ciency of politicians. In addition, if “individualism” constitutes a
key facet in neo-liberal populism, it is replaced by networked
individualism within the optimistic perspective of technopopu-
lism. Another key ﬁgure to emphasise is meritocracy, a loaded
and controversial term that is often used in an ideological man-
ner. As Jo Littler stated in 2013, “we should pay close attention to
meritocracy because it has become a key ideological means by
which plutocracy—or government by a wealthy élite—perpe-
tuates itself through neo-liberal culture. It is not, in other words,
merely a coincidence that the common idea that we live, or
should live, in a meritocratic age co-exists with a pronounced lack
of social mobility and the continuation of vested hereditary
economic interests” (see also Littler, 2018). We have found the
word “meritocracy” and the semantic constellation of related
terms in almost all political programmes and party manifestos.
A great number of papers and research reports have been
dedicated to the analysis of sovereignist populism, its relationship
with the concept of national community and, in general, to the
exclusionary populism launched and supported by the new right-
wing parties. Even if the anti-system perspective can be mutually
implemented by right and left parties, we have noted a discursive
difference between left-wing parties and right-wing parties
regarding the concept of sovereignty. Left-wing parties (those that
can be inserted into the social populism area) deﬁne sovereignty
as constitutional popular control, while right-wing parties (and
especially far-right movements and parties) translate sovereignty
into an exclusionary sovereignism. We have found some simila-
rities between exclusionary populism and what we have called
national/ethnic populism
The logic of “us vs. them” is common in the populists’ appeal,
and it has been used as an indicator to deﬁne the same conception
of populism. In this perspective, we can use the Weyland’s con-
ception of populism. Having presented the “people” as the “losers”
of modernisation, he identiﬁes the “élites” with the old political
class. Indeed, populist supporters consider oligarchies as the
exploiters who have caused their present woes. Therefore, strong
attacks against the perceived (or existing) oligarchy have a double
function: they enhance the populist leader’s authoritarian face to
his or her electors while at the same time, they contribute to
eroding the opponents’ legitimacy. The individuation of a poli-
tical enemy is necessary to unify support, as has been well
described by John Thompson (1995) when he illustrates the tools
through which ideology works. It is no surprise that populism
emerges in times of crisis: in such cases, allegedly inept and
corrupt political leadership often becomes the ﬁrst target of
popular anger, in this way facilitating the conveyance of the
populist message (Weyland, 1996).
Among the key ﬁgures shown in Table 3, we also highlight the
constant call to Christian roots; this is almost exclusively present
in right-wing populism. The religious argument is nevertheless
used in conjunction with the idea of defending national sover-
eignty and/or opposing to the “invasion of migrants”.18
Our study has taken into account, in Italy, four parties (Partito
Democratico-Democratic Party, Forza Italia-Go Italy!, Lega Nord-
North League and Movimento Cinque Stelle-Five Star Movement)
and their leaders (Matteo Renzi, Silvio Berlusconi, Matteo Salvini
and Beppe Grillo19). We have not found elements of “socialT
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populism” in these political actors; some elements of this form of
populism seem to be present in some radical left-wing formations
and even in new civic aggregations: however, they have not been
studied and will be the subject of subsequent research work.20
Among the four types of populisms, a special short analysis is
dedicated to technopopulism, which derives from the correlation
of populism, technocracy and the rising importance of digital
communication (De Blasio, 2014; Marres, 2017).
Technopopulism
Among the four types of populism we have deﬁned, technopo-
pulism represents a major emerging innovation, although the
relationship between populism and technology is not new in the
European political scene. Some commentators have suggested
that the old opposition between left and right has been replaced
by the “cleavage” between populism and technocracy (Ferguson
2015). We believe that the question should be framed in another
way, considering from one side the opposition between tech-
nocracy and techno-libertarianism and from the other side, the
relationship between populism and technocracy. “Technocracy
holds that there is only one correct policy solution; populism
holds that there is only one authentic will of the people” (Müller,
2017). This means that both technocracy and populism are, in a
certain way, apolitical and ready to reject democratic debate.
Alongside the traditional semantic oppositions in which
populism lives and from which it is fed (true people vs. élites),
new “social storytelling” has emerged in recent years. Surely one
of the most interesting stories is that of the opposition between
technocracy (mostly associated with European institutions, albeit
not exclusively) and techno-libertarianism, often associated with
the extensive use of digital technology and with the Internet as an
open and accessible space. The latter, simultaneously features the
modernity of youth and the opportunity (coming mainly from
democratic participation platforms) to develop a “real” direct
democracy at low cost and without party interference. The Eur-
ope of technocrats—as it is spuriously deﬁned—is constantly
present in the political manifestos of the North League, the Five
Star Movement and even in the speeches of the Democratic Party
leader—Matteo Renzi—who was also Prime Minister for 3 years.
Technocracy can be traced back to a number of problems: from
the sentimental disconnection between European institutions and
citizens to the economic crisis. On the opposite side, the rhetoric
on technological innovation and techno-libertarianism does not
appear to fascinate the North League, but it is highly present both
in the political metaphors of Matteo Renzi and in the centrality of
online direct democracy as proposed by the Five Star
Movement21
We agree with Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti (2017) when
they write that “far from being political opposites (or even cor-
rectives) for one another, populism and technocracy can only be
understood—and therefore approached—together, as parallel
expression of the same underlying set of phenomena” (Bickerton
and Invernizzi Accetti, 2017, p 327).
The ostentation of advanced technology tools, the use of
technological metaphors, and the centrality of social media in the
relationship with citizens are some of the most obvious elements
in the public speeches of the Democratic Party leader. Beppe
Grillo, by contrast, prefers to ﬂaunt his movement’s platform of
direct democracy, often referred to it as a sort of quasi-alternative
instrument to parliament (despite its being only open to party
members).22
The rhetoric of digital technologies for participation has been
highly present in Italian politics over the last few years, and it has
been de facto legitimised by the new centrality assumed by the
public participation platforms used by the state to promote open
government.23 From this perspective, we must remember that one
of the rhetorical arguments accompanying the advance of neo-
liberalism24 found its strong points in two keywords: 1) quantity
and 2) efﬁciency.
The concept of quantity is closely linked to that of “accumu-
lation” but, unlike the latter, it does not only involve the economic
sphere. In fact, it relates to the need for a wide range of services
or, rather, an ample quantity of services, although this is actually
just in theory. The concept of efﬁciency, however, is often deﬁned
through its temporal dimension; according to this deﬁnition, an
efﬁcient state would be one in which there is a very short reaction
time between making policy proposals and carrying them out. In
short, an efﬁcient state has rapid, effective decision-making
procedures that are legitimised by the spectacular rules of the so-
called “audience democracies” (Manin 1995). An efﬁcient state
therefore requires a strong executive at the centre and has no
need for the red tape of parliamentary procedures: this leads to
the idea that parliaments should reduce their competencies (or
perhaps even disappear or be replaced by more “lightweight”
institutions). Here, we ﬁnd some of the linkages between tech-
nopopulist rhetoric and neo-liberal populism (in which some
traces of techno-libertarianism are present).
These two aspects are very often present in the discourses and
programmatic documents of both the Five Star Movement and
the Democratic Party; they seem to ﬁnd a point of contact in
“surrogate representation” (Mansbridge, 2003, 2011), which is
also a “tool” to facilitate the institutionalisation of neo-populist
parties.
Then, technopopulism can at least be deﬁned as “the belief that
the ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’
(Lincoln, 1953 [1863]) is achievable by means of information
communications technology. The term “belief” denotes here an
ideology, not in the Marxian sense of a false consciousness but in
the Althusserian sense of a set of ideas that have a material
existence (Althusser, 1971). Technopopulism can also be under-
stood in Foucauldian terms as an emerging discourse (Foucault,
1972), “that is, as a body of knowledge, norms, attitudes, and
practices that arise from the hybridisation of two pre-existing
discourses: populism and techno-libertarianism” (Deseriis, 2017,
p 441).25 The issue of technopopulist parties can be further
explored with the use of various empirical tools. At the same time,
however, if we consider technopopulism as an emerging discourse
or a “discursive ideology,” we should also consider the possibility
of ﬁnding elements and dimensions of technopopulism even in
parties not clearly deﬁnable as “techno-parties”. What is obvious,
however, is that both technopopulism and technocratic approa-
ches in neo-liberal populism ﬁnd common ground in considering
technology as a framework and not as a tool. This commonality is
a further element that conﬁrms the distance between new
emerging populisms and the practices of deliberative and parti-
cipatory democracy.
Our analysis also suggests that technopopulism can be con-
sidered to be one the basic elements of the new trends of depo-
liticisation (Hay, 2007, 2014; Fawcett et al., 2017). At the same
time, hyper-representation, favouring an anti-pluralist wave,
constitutes another important tool for depoliticisation processes.
If social populism—in Laclau’s (2005) perspective—can represent
a counter-depoliticisation tool, technopopulism constitutes a way
to strengthen the depoliticisation process of Western
democracies.
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Notes
1 Populism often arises at times of crisis, and this trend is strongly linked with national
identity. This is true in the Italian case as well. In this context, the nation and the state
are separated, with the nation being held in higher esteem than the state. The use of
national symbols in the linguistic and visual representation of populism highlights
this situation (in this regard, consider the concept of “national-popular” as stated by
Antonio Gramsci; see Forgacs, 1999, pp 363–370). In this article, however, we avoid
discussing this important topic, which deserves a deeper analysis.
2 Usually, populism is deﬁned using the idea of an antagonistic relationship between
‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ (Canovan, 1981; 1999; 2002; Laclau, 1979; 2005; Mény and
Surel, 2002a; Mudde, 2004; Taggart, 2000). This idea requires the pre-conception that
people should be conceived as characterised by homogeneous unity. Following this
theoretical background, Cas Mudde has deﬁned populism as a “thin-centred”
ideology. Abts and Rummens (2007, p 407) propose another deﬁnition (or at least
not contrasting with Mudde’s): “in order to provide the most concise deﬁnition
possible, we offer to deﬁne populism more frugally as a thin-centred ideology which
advocates the sovereign rule of the people as a homogeneous body”. Abts and
Rummes also propose differentiating between the “popular appeals” of some political
parties and populist political parties. We fully agree with this cultural position;
regardless, it is very difﬁcult—from an empirical perspective—to clearly identify
populist parties. In many cases, in fact, the personalisation of politics gives us populist
leaders even in political parties with a high level of presence within institutions.
Alongside the governmental anti-politics, we should also study the many forms of
governmental populism.
3 According to Francesco Raniolo (2013), political parties have ﬁve salient dimensions:
(a) the competitive dimension, which is namely the search for votes to obtain public
ofﬁce; (b) the teleological dimension, that is, the action aimed at achieving speciﬁc
objectives; (c) the sociological dimension, as the parties reﬂect the cleavages that cross
a society; (d) the organisational dimension, since parties have continuity over time,
internal articulation and territorial rooting; and (e) the institutional dimension, since
they exist only within a rational legal order. If parties do not have the capacity to
redeﬁne themselves along the new social cleavages, it becomes impossible for them to
build a connection with the people they should represent.
4 A concise and useful overview of the concept of populism (and of the state of the art
in social and political science) is in Rovira Kaltwasser et al. (2017).
5 The “hypertrophy of popular sovereignty” (Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti, 2017, p
337).
6 Also within the mainstream parties, we can easily observe some populist
transformations (Mair, 2002). For this reason, we have considered in our analysis both
Forza Italia (Go Italy!) and the Partito Democratico (the Democratic Party) with their
controversial leaders, Silvio Berlusconi and Matteo Renzi. A brilliant analysis of the
Democratic Party as the “last traditional party” can be read in Natale and Fasano (2017).
7 Discussing his theory of populism, Cas Mudde observes that there is essentially one
constant to consider: a simplistic division of society in two opposing factions.
Populism must therefore be deﬁned as an ideology, which leads to a singular,
confusing issue. For Mudde, populism is “an ideology that considers society to be
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’
vs. ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the
volonté générale (general will) of the people”. (Mudde, 2004, p 543) Elaborating upon
his deﬁnition, he concludes that populism is a “thin-centred” ideology, meaning an
ideology deﬁned by a limited number of core political concepts. Thus, it can be easily
combined with either similar or more complex ideologies, such as socialism or
nationalism. The core concept of populism is then the existence of “the people” and,
therefore, of an evil “elite” as well (oligarchy, or the Italian term, “casta” deﬁne a small
group of privileged people who have power and money; in its semantic explosion, the
term “casta” can also deﬁne all members of the “not-people”).
8 A further part of our research—not presented here—comprises the study of political
parties’ policy proposals. Their impact has been assessed using an original approach
to policy analysis (Lasswell, 1971; Cotta, della Porta and Morlino, 2008).
9 “In Italy, the language of the ﬁnancial crisis uses the lexicon of newism, which does
not mean it uses new words but that it upturns the content of old words: an
enantiosemic lexicon in which a word is used to designate its opposite” (Cedroni,
2010, p 45).
10 The term “caste” is suddenly being used everywhere in journalism and in Italian
politics to emphasise the separateness (and privilege) of “professional politicians”.
11 Some authors see the same characteristics in the Argentinean movement of the
descamisados (and in Peronism, more generally) and even in the Fascist rhetoric of the
“combatant” (who is part of the populace) who opposes a “non-populace” of cowardly
and disloyal people (whom Fascist rhetoric obviously equates with the Democratic
opposition). On these topics see Ionescu and Gellner, 1969; Weyland, 1999.
12 See the anti-intellectual statements of Donald Trump (Leonid Bershkidky on Chicago
Tribune of 14 November 2016: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/
commentary/ct-donald-trump-revolution-elites-intellectuals-20161114-story.html).
13 “Do you imagine the Christian Democrats could have won the day on 18 April if they
hadn’t had a moral strength, a guiding concept, that is worth much more than all the
so-called culture (culturame) of some people?”
14 The term “leaderism” refers to emphasis on the role of the political leader. Leaderism
is the over-estimated centrality of the leader. Leaderism is an emerging discourse (in
Foucauldian terms) and is often one of the drivers of a political party’s
presidentialisation process. See Higgins, 2012; Mazzoleni, 2012; Papadopoulos, 2013.
15 This study has been recently expanded to other variables, such as the policy
documents proposed by the political parties in four policy areas (family and welfare,
security, citizenship, Europe) to compare the policy proposals with the propaganda
rhetoric. All of this research is still in process because it is part of a two-year project
on populism and democracy.
16 The idea of a “democratic” populism derives from Ernesto Laclau’s inﬂuential studies
on populism and democracy. Laclau (1977) argues that populism can be “articulated”
with any position on the political spectrum, with the rhetoric adapted to
accommodate shifts in political doctrine. This bottom-up adaptability can also be
considered very close (also if from a different political perspective) to the people-
driven adaptability for government typical of the authoritarian populism expressed by,
for example, Margaret Thatcher (Hall, 1985; Higgins, 2013).
17 Radical left is an ambiguous term because it designates both Marxist/post-Marxist
parties and new political forces such as Podemos. The semantic meaning of the
expression can also vary in different geographic contexts: some Italian politicians, for
example, consider Jeremy Corbyn (leader of the British Labour Party) to be a “radical
leftist”.
18 The claim for religion and the religious aspects of everyday life are important
elements of some populisms. Some religious communities are backing some of the
new populisms, others are exercising their prophetic ofﬁce, and still other religious
communities are trying to maintain a sort of neutrality. Nadia Marzouki, Duncan
McDonnell, and Olivier Roy (2016) stated that there is an important distinction to be
drawn between the churches and the populist movements. In fact, populists speak of
identity and churches speak of faith. Regardless, religious (or presumed religious)
backgrounds are also present in some new populist political parties. We have decided
to not deepen this topic both due to its complexity and its irrelevance in the scenario
illustrated by our analysis in this context.
19 Beppe Grillo, a former comedian, is the founder and inspirational leader of M5S; he
presents a ﬁgure that is different from the others. Nonetheless, he can be considered
an authoritative and inﬂuential leader of the -party.
20 Some elements of social/democratic populism can be found in the Spanish political
party Podemos. Podemos is sometimes associated with the Italian Five Star
Movement; it can be useful to underline that many differences exist between the two
political aggregations. The ﬁrst difference concerns the speciﬁc constituencies of the
two parties (Segatti and Capuzzi, 2016); the second involves internal organisation and
the policy proposal process; a third difference concerns political assets: while
Podemos is deﬁnitely an anti-establishment party, the Five Star Movement play a
political role in the interstitial space between the anti-establishment approach and a
radical anti-system position. The Five Star Movement presents, in fact, a double-faced
identity; from one side, the environmentalist background of the old grouping while
from the other, a personal populist party, with a boss who controls the parliamentary
group and the representatives in elective assemblies and who is the facilitator of the
break with the traditional political establishment. The stratarchical organisation
(Bardi et al., 2014) of the Five-Star Movement contributes to empowering the role of
the charismatic leader as the hyper-representative of the “true people” struggling with
the “non-people”.
21 The latest generation of “technopopulist parties” includes the Five Star Movement in
Italy, Podemos in Spain, and the Pirate Party in Iceland (and, more generally, the
different Pirate Parties across Europe). There are some important and peculiar
differences among these parties (Damiani and Viviani 2018; Deseriis, 2017). In our
opinion, Podemos and the Icelandic Pirate Party can surely be deﬁned as techno-
parties, but they cannot be completely framed into technopopulism, basically because
they do not use technological tools to expand the phenomenon of hyper-
representation. At the same time, these two parties tend to exclude–in their internal
organisations as well–plebiscitary-style drifts.
22 The idea of a direct democracy achieved through participatory democracy software
(such as Liquid Feedback and now with the proprietary platform Rousseau) has
always been present in Beppe Grillo’s speeches, and it has been one of the basic point
of M5S’ political programme from its origin. The myth of online direct democracy is
an outcome of direct democracy (which is one of the measures proposed by populist
parties to replace the “declining” representation system); usually, it is not connected
with the idea of a deliberative e-democracy.
23 Honestly, we should also note that communication and digital media seem really to
give new opportunities for political inclusion: from e-voting technicalities to the
computerisation of organisational infrastructure and circuits of parliamentary
decision-making and ultimately the creation of a new public sphere centred on
discursive and participatory/deliberative practices. Technology, in other words, can
also play a role in the renewal of the old mass parties (now often liquid and
stratarchically presidentialised) and the new ones (caught between franchise models
and genuinely participatory trends).
24 Here, we refer to neo-liberalism as it has been deﬁned, among others, by Crouch
(2003; 2011), della Porta (2013), and Streeck (2014).
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25 Marco Deseriis distinguishes between two variants of technopopulism: “a
technocratic and leaderless variant, which pursues and enacts meritocratic forms of
democratic participation; and a leaderist, more strictly populist, variant wherein
charismatic leaders play a critical role in conferring unity and identity to their parties”
(Deseriis, 2017, p 441).
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